by Claudio Bertolotti
The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL, ISIS, or more simply IS) is attempting to expand its influence from the Middle East to Asia, in particular to Pakistan, India and Afghanistan.
A possible confirmation of the results obtained by the Jihadi-group linked to the IS could be confirmed by the 4th of October declaration of allegiance of a part of the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP) to the group and its chief, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (the self-appointed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Qureshi al Hussaini). The TTP is still formally allied with al Qaeda, and operates mainly in Pakistan’s northwestern tribal areas near the border with Afghanistan.
It is reported that Shahidullah Shahid, the TTP’ spokesman, and five senior members and important regional leaders of the movement vowed allegiance to the IS; in particular the leaders who declared their support to the IS are the regional heads in the northwestern cities of Peshawar, Hangu, the Orakzai, Kurram and Khyber tribal areas (in total is assessed the amount of the defecting groups could involve 700/1000 fighters).
This event, which could underscores divisions among Islamist Armed Opposition Groups as the IS rises, marked the first instance of a major contingent of Taliban figures signaling, on the one hand, a renouncement of fealty to the Afghan Taliban’s leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar; on the other hand, this shift in loyalties could, firstly, weaken the Afghan Taliban and, secondly, create more vulnerabilities to the Pakistan and Afghanistan states because of the violence and the aggressive policy largely used by the IS in Iraq and Syria.
But, what is important to underline is that, even if these commanders could remain part of the Pakistani Taliban’s organization, they will probably represent IS in Pakistan.
IS, Al-Qaeda and Jihadi propaganda in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India: weakness and strengths.
There are signs that the IS could gain grip in South East Asian countries, in particular in Pakistan, thanks to propaganda and recruitment activities. In October, a manifesto was distributed in Peshawar areas, inviting people to join the group in order to establish a Muslim caliphate; at the same time stickers and wall drawings have been spotted, as well as sporting IS t-shirts have been distributed within Indian Muslim areas.
In addition, open sources reported that some Pakistanis and Afghanis are operating in Syria and Iraq fighting under the IS flag, as well as some Indians joined IS.
As response, Al-Qaeda is actively reacting to IS initiatives. One example is represented by the video message released by the Al Qaeda head, Ayman al-Zawahiri, announcing the establishment of a new group named “Qaedat al-Jihad in the Indian subcontinent”. This initiative, after a long-silence period, could be read as a sign that al-Qaeda is reacting to the IS pressure and “successes” in the Middle East and the attempt to penetrate South East Asia.
In the message, Zawahiri discussed “differences and discord” among jihadists – with possible reference to IS – and called Jihadi fighters to unite, invoking Osama bin Laden, insisting on the concepts of artificial borders (to be deleted) and the “Tawhid” (monotheism).
Simultaneously, the competition is conducted on the “virtual” front through social media campaigns on “Twitter”, “Facebook”, “Youtube”, “Instagram”; in this case IS is winning the competition thanks to an aggressive, effective and successful communication strategy based on western approach and methods.
It is clear that these simultaneous efforts aimed to recruiting fighters and supporters are signs that both the groups are in competition for the dominance in the region, with al Qaeda in trouble seeking to reassert its supremacy as a bursting IS raises in attractiveness.
Brief Analysis
On the one hand, the sum and the connections of the dynamics deriving from the entry of a new group in the area of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, could drive to more violence; as consequence tensions will rise increasing divisions among the groups, in particular involving more communities and armed opposition groups, religious minorities in Pakistan, India and Afghanistan, as well as non-Sunni Muslims, and those Jihadists consider as heretics. It is assessed that overall violence in the region is likely to rise because if a group is conducting a more aggressive campaign, the other groups will also escalate their activities and initiatives. This could be a direct threat to the stability of Afghanistan and to the US and Nato’s role in the country.
On the other hand, as consequence of the changed equilibrium, Al Qaeda and the IS have significantly stepped up their recruiting efforts in Pakistan and in other South East Asian countries; it changed the regional dynamics: a change which must stimulate analysts and governments to pay attention to the competition between the two groups to enlist radicalized fighters. Fighters that, in particular, could be involved in local conflicts as well as in the global jihad carried out by the IS supporters and leaders.
On the “market” of the regional Jihad there are now two different and contending brands: the traditional “Al-Qaeda style” and the modern and fashionable Islamic State. The second one continues to gain followers.
